Kolloquien / Colloquia

A	Information, Wissen, Bildung	Dienstag / Tuesday, 12.09. 9:00–12:30, Hörsaal 1a
B	Science in Application	Dienstag / Tuesday, 12.09. 9:00–12:30, Hörsaal 1b
C	Ethics: Foundations and Applications	Dienstag / Tuesday, 12.09. 9:00–12:30, Hörsaal 2

D	Woher kommen die Werte?	Mittwoch / Wednesday, 13.09. 9:00–12:30, Hörsaal H 1a
E	How Can Rationality Be Normative?	Mittwoch / Wednesday, 13.09. 9:00–12:30, Hörsaal H 1b
F	Thought Experiments, Conceivability, and Philosophical Knowledge	Mittwoch / Wednesday, 13.09. 9:00–12:30, Hörsaal H 2

Bitte beachten

Alle Zeitangaben umfassen die Vortragszeit *inklusive* der Diskussionszeit. Die Länge der Kolloquiumsvorträge variiert.

Please note

All times specified include the time reserved for discussion. The time allocated to colloquia talks varies.

A Nortmann

'Klüger und effizienter in der 'Wissensgesellschaft'? Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme

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Im Vortrag wird unterschieden zwischen gut und kleinteilig portionierbarem Wissen einerseits und Zusammenhangswissen andererseits (etwa im Anschluss an Platons 'Theaitetos'). Es wird dargelegt, dass kognitive Ressourcenbeschränkungen (wie eine begrenzte Gedächtniskapazität bei menschlichen Individuen) in vielen Fällen die verständnisstiftende Herausbildung von gut organisierten Beständen von Zusammenhangswissen zu veranlassen helfen. Daraus wird der Schluss gezogen, dass Informationsquellen wie das Internet, die in quantitativer Hinsicht nahezu keinen Kapazitätsgrenzen zu unterliegen scheinen, möglicherweise eben deshalb keine Gewähr dafür bieten, uns langfristig klüger zu machen.

Wo Personen es sich zum Ziel setzen, grössere Corpora von Zusammenhangswissen in irgendeinem für sie interessanten Bereich aufzubauen, ist die Grundlage für das gegeben, was man 'intellektuelle Projekte' von Personen nennen kann. Die Ausbildung der Disposition, sich intellektuelle Projekte überhaupt vorzunehmen, wird als eine wichtige Komponente des persönlichkeitsbildenden Effekts intellektueller 'Bildung' benannt.

A von Rauchhaupt

Von der Information zum Wissen

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"Ich weiß, wie eine Klarinette klingt". Dieser Beispielsatz aus Wittgensteins "Philosophischen Untersuchungen" legt nahe, daß eine Bestimmung von Wissen als etwas rein sprachlich oder gar kommunikativ Konstituiertes zu kurz greift. Gleichwohl muß ein praktikabler Wissensbegriff in engem Zusammenhang mit dem alltagssprachlichen Gebrauch von Wörtern wie "Information" oder "Daten" stehen. Der Beitrag schlägt einen Wissensbegriff vor, der versucht, diesem Problem Rechnung zu tragen.

Cartwright B

Evidence for Use: Where Is our Theory of it?

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Each of our well-developed scientific subdisciplines, from physics through biomedical research to anthropology and economics, have methods for gathering and evaluating evidence that are detailed and well practiced. For these, clear arguments can be made in defense of the methods as appropriate for warranting the kinds of claims studied. But the kinds of claims we need to know about to evaluate proposed policy and/or technology developments are seldom in the remit of any single discipline. A wide variety of different kinds of evidence bearing on the proposal in different ways must be considered. Here our well-developed methods for evaluating degree of warrant give out and so too, I shall argue, do our philosophic theories of evidence. The talk will review some proposals on offer and urge a serious philsophical attack on this issue.

Galison B

The Pyramid and the Ring

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For a very long time, culminating in the 1970s and 1980s, an image hovered over physics–an image of an epistemic pyramid with particle physics (and then string theory) at the peak and a descending construction of all the other branches of physics expanding beneath it. This hierarchy has begun to re-form. It is not so much that physics is slipping into another ontology–another formulation of the ontological problem; instead, I'll argue here, the ontological problem itself has begun to dissolve in favor of other scientific virtues. String theorists look to deepen their conceptual tools of field the-

ory, they aim to explain some of the deepest structures of mathematics–rather than providing a "theory of everything" in quite the way it was formulated 20 years ago. Nanoscientists aim to build–not to demonstrate existence. They are after an engineering way of being in science, rather than that of a 17th-century natural philosopher. And simulators want to understand new forms of dynamics–not to locate particular entities as the building blocks of all else. What is emerging is not a new ontology, but a science composed of a set of intricately-connected disciplines with no center: a ring.

C Birnbacher

The Limits of Life and the Limits of Philosophy

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My talk will develop the thesis that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aims an analysis of fundamental concepts can legitimately pursue in "ethically sensitive" contexts. This thesis is exemplified by a critical discussion of the position taken by Jeff MacMahan in the question of brain death in his book "The Ethics of Killing". It is argued that though, probably, the justifications commonly given for the identification of death with brain death are incoherent, there are strong pragmatic pressures of preserving the univocity of the concept of a human life and to define the beginning and the end of life in a socially acceptable way.

C McMahan

Death: Metaphysics, Morality, and Law?

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I will argue that the dominant views in the west about when we begin to exist and when we cease to exist are mistaken and indefensible. My claims and arguments will be metaphysical but they have significant implications for morality and politics. They support some common moral views but are subversive of others. They do not, however, completely determine what our moral beliefs ought to be. I will, indeed, try to show that the methodology that I employ in reasoning about the metaphysics of our identity has an evaluative component and thus that the intuitions to which my arguments appeal could support the same moral views even if we were to draw different metaphysical conclusions. I will concede that the position for which I argue is easy to misunderstand or misinterpret and could be subject to deliberate abuse.

As philosophers, however, we ought not to defer to common prejudices but ought to try to direct common opinion away from superstition and error. We cannot, of course, engage in metaphysical and moral reasoning without regard for the likely consequences of our reasoning and advocacy. But in general the best way to address pragmatic problems is not to modify our philosophical conclusions but is instead to recognize that moral principles often cannot be directly translated into law or policy. Laws and policies though not moral principles must be crafted with an eye to the consequences of their promulgation, enactment, and enforcement.

Joas D

Wertegeneralisierung

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In der politisch-philosophischen Diskussion besteht oft die Auffassung, es gebe eine Alternative zwischen einer rational-argumentativen und einer religiös-werthaften Begründung des normativen Charakters der modernen Demokratie. An dieser Alternative ist vieles falsch. Der Vortrag geht allerdings von einer skeptischen Einschätzung einer rationalen Letztbegründungsmöglichkeit aus und entwickelt kurz die Vorstellung des Verfassers vom Charakter von Wertbindungen und von deren Entstehung. Dann geht es darum, die Spezifik von Religionen (gegenüber bloßen Wertsystemen) herauszuarbeiten und zu fragen, wie diese eigentlich in ein produktives Verhältnis zueinander treten können. Nach diesen Reflexionen auf die Mög-

lichkeit interreligiösen Dialogs muß das Verhältnis von Religion und politischer Ethik untersucht werden. Nur mit größter Vorsicht läßt sich Religionen überhaupt eine Art inhärenter politischer Ethik zusprechen. Die heute oft behauptete Neigung des Christentums zu Demokratie und Menschenrechten ist historisch schwer zu halten. Nur von einer selbstkritischen (und nicht triumphalistischen) Sicht auf die Geschichte christlicher Begründungen für Demokratie und Menschenrechte aus läßt sich eine Brücke bauen zur Suche nach religiösen Begründungen für Demokratie und Menschenrechte in anderen religiösen Traditionen. Damit kommen die religiösen Traditionen in einen interreligiösen Dialog auch über politische Ethik, ohne daß der Dialog darauf reduziert würde. Leitfaden meiner Überlegungen ist der auf Talcott Parsons zurückgehende Begriff der Wertegeneralisierung, der nicht den Übergang von partikularen Werttraditionen zu rationalen Universalismen bezeichnen soll, sondern die Erarbeitung des Universalismus ohne Bruch mit den partikularen Bindungskräften der Traditionen.

D Hoerster

Worauf basieren unsere Grundwerte?

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Erörtert werden soll die Frage, auf welche Weise gewisse zentrale Grundwerte unserer Rechtsordnung, wie sie in der Verfassung dieser Rechtsordnung verankert sind, Gegenstand einer intersubjektiv überzeugenden Begründung sein können. Unter Grundwerten dieser Art verstehe ich vor allem individuelle Grundrechte wie das Recht auf Leben, Institutionen wie die Ehe und Voraussetzungen gültiger Rechtsetzung wie das Demokratieprinzip.

Zweifellos *basieren* sämtliche dieser Grundwerte unserer Verfassung in dem Sinn auf bestimmten in der Gesellschaft verbreiteten Auffassungen, daß die rechtliche Geltung dieser Grundwerte auf diese Auffassungen in der Bevölkerung zurückgeht. Das bedeutet freilich nicht, daß diese Auffassungen auch einer rationalen Kritik standhalten und insofern diese Grundwerte tatsächlich *begründen* können. Dabei ist nicht auszuschließen, daß ein in der Verfassung enthaltener Grundwert sich zwar durchaus begründen läßt, daß jedoch die in der

Gesellschaft vorherrschende Auffassung, die diesen Grundwert stützt, keine stichhaltige Begründung darstellt.

Besonderes Interesse verdient die häufig vertretene These, jeder Versuch einer Begründung sei so oder so unvermeidlich *weltanschaulicher* Natur. Deshalb sei es gleichgültig – und also auch *gleich gültig* –, ob diese Begründung sich etwa auf religiöse Vorstellungen, metaphysische Konstrukte, abrufbare Intuitionen oder vorhandene menschliche Interessen stützt. Unter anderem möchte ich zeigen, daß diese These falsch ist.

Bishop E

The Difference between Models and Theories

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All branches of science tell us how we ought to reason. Physics tells us how we ought to reason about physical matters, chemistry tells us how we ought to reason about chemical matters, etc. But at least three areas of psychology (predictive modeling, heuristics and biases, and fast and frugal heuristics) make explicit, epistemological judgments about how we ought to reason about matters that have nothing to do with the subject matter of psychology. If this is correct, it undermines a common view about science and philosophy, namely, that science is entirely descriptive, while philosophy is the exclusive and proper domain of the normative. Parts of psychology are essentially normative.

In "Epistemology Naturalized" Quine famously argued that epistemology is a branch of psychology. This has seemed absurd to a generation of epistemologists who take psychology to be purely descriptive and epistemology to be essentially normative. But if parts of psychology are essentially normative, then perhaps it is time to reconsider Quine's proposal. In fact, J.D. Trout and I defended and employed an approach to epistemology that attempts to unearth the normative framework that grounds the epistemological judgments of psychology (*Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment*). This framework is a broadly reliabilist one:

"We do not compare human judgment with the laws of logic or probability, but rather examine how it fares in real-world environments. The func-

tion of heuristics is not to be coherent. Rather, their function is to make reasonable, adaptive inferences about the real social and physical world given limited time and knowledge." (Gigerenzer and Todd, "Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox" in *Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart*, p. 22).

This is not reliabilism about justification (or knowledge) that has been articulated and defended brilliantly by Alvin Goldman (see, e.g., *Epistemology and Cognition*). The reliabilist framework that grounds psychology is one that applies primarily to reasoning strategies rather than belief tokens. As such, it is more naturally thought of as a theory of epistemic rationality (a theory of reasoning excellence) rather than a theory of epistemic justification (a theory of justified belief). I will argue that taking reliabilism to be a theory of rationality rather than a theory of justification has a number of benefits. In particular, such a theory can co-opt the strengths of Goldman's reliabilist theory of justification, avoid some of its pitfalls, and perhaps even provide the resources to solve some of its problems.

E | Gigerenzer

Can Reasoning be Rational and Psychological?

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During the Enlightenment, the rational and the psychological were two sides of the same coin, but in the last century, following Leonard Savage, the normative was divorced from the descriptive. This separation is exemplified in as-if theories that propose that people should behave as if they maximized expected utility, with little interest in the actual process of decision making. I argue that a normative theory of rationality should incorporate (i) the evolved abilities of the mind, (ii) the ecological (rather than logical) rationality of behavior, and (iii) dispense with computationally intractable normative theories, such as Bayesian probability updating. The alternative that my collaborators and I propose is the psychological theory of the *adaptive toolbox* and the associated normative theory of *ecological rationality*.

Goldmann | E

The Nature and Possibility of Rationality: Normative Principles and Methods of Investigation

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This paper explores the space of possible approaches to rationality, especially epistemic rationality (E-rationality). Three major questions are examined. First, what is the best general approach to the normativity of E-rationality: consequentialism or non-consequentialism? Second, what are the proper roles, if any, for empirical sciences, formal sciences (e.g., logic, probability theory, statistics), and intuitive judgment in the study of rationality? Third, what role should be played in a theory of rationality by psychological resource constraints? These questions are obviously interrelated. For example, whether one adopts a consequentialist or non-consequentialist approach, one might hold that candidates for E-rational procedures, at least procedures that are rational *for human beings*, must be ones that are psychologically feasible for human cognizers, (perhaps) without special education or training. Formally specifiable computational procedures that are not humanly tractable do not constitute rules of rationality (hence people aren't irrational for failing to execute them). The existence and importance of resource constraints would obviously imply that psychology and allied empirical sciences are essential to the study of E-rationality. This leads to a (partial) "naturalization" of the topic. What are the implications of this constraint for the heuristics and biases approach and the cognitive ecology approach to E-rationality? If the study of E-rationality is partly naturalized, what happens to the intuitional methodology of standard analytic epistemology? Does it have any legitimacy in the study of E-rationality (or elsewhere in philosophy)?

F | Chalmers

Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress

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Is there a distinction between questions of fact and questions of language? Even among those who reject an analytic-synthetic distinction, a version of the original distinction is omnipresent in philosophy, in the notion of a terminological dispute. Here, I aim to clarify the notion of a terminological dispute, and to articulate the role that dissolving terminological disputes can play as a method of philosophical progress. I will also bring the analysis to bear on questions about primitive concepts and the nature of conceptual analysis.

F Williamson

Imagination and Knowledge of Necessity

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The epistemology of metaphysical modality tends to be treated as *sui generis*. This paper argues that, to the contrary, it should be subsumed under the epistemology of counterfactual conditionals. The cognitive value of counterfactual conditionals is illustrated in some simple cases. Then a rough account of the epistemology of counterfactual conditionals is sketched. The conception of it as based on reasoning from a counterfactual supposition is argued to be problematic. An alternative account is developed on which the constrained use of the imagination plays a central role. This has some affinity to a simulation account, because it involves the running of cognitive faculties offline, but should not be considered strictly as involving the simulation of the mental states of a hypothetical observer. Next, it is argued from simple premises that claims of metaphysical necessity are logically equivalent to counterfactual conditionals. This allows the epistemology of metaphysical modality to be treated as a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual conditionals. In particular, the appropriate context for assessing conceivability as a test of possibility and inconceivability as a test of impossibility is the legitimate use of the imagination in the acquisition of mundane knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. In response to the question whether knowledge of metaphysical modality so gained is *a priori* or *a posteriori*, it is argued that the distinction is too unclear to be useful, because in such cases past experience plays a role that goes beyond enabling the subject to acquire the concepts in question but falls short of constituting evidence.